[Submitted on 26 Jul 2026]

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Abstract:Hardware Trojans embedded by malicious entities in integrated circuits can covertly leak sensitive information through power side channels, often remaining undetected in their dormant state until specific trigger conditions activate their malicious behavior. For information-leaking Trojans, detection in the dormant state is critical, as once triggered, the secret data is already exfiltrated. This paper introduces a patch-based Transformer architecture for detecting dormant hardware Trojans through frequency-domain analysis of power traces. Our approach converts time-domain power measurements into frequency-domain representations using real Fast Fourier Transform (rFFT), revealing spectral signatures hidden in conventional time-series analysis. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves 90.94% average detection accuracy across dormant and active Trojan scenarios, outperforming state-of-the-art approaches particularly in detecting dormant Trojans that prior time-domain methods do not address.

Submission history

From: Amin Rezaei [view email]
[v1] Sun, 26 Jul 2026 02:38:38 UTC (318 KB)