[Submitted on 27 Jul 2026]

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Abstract:Jailbreak defenses are essential for protecting large language models (LLMs), but they can also introduce secondary costs that weaken model utility. We present a systematic study of these defense trade-offs along three dimensions: performance impact, over-refusal on benign inputs, and inference cost. Rather than treating defenses as a single class, we organize them by operational strategy and examine how different strategies correlate with different side-effect profiles. Across state-of-the-art defense methods, widely used benchmark datasets, and representative open-source LLMs, we find that defenses rarely improve downstream capability, but instead vary in how they trade safety gains against usability and efficiency. In particular, rule-based defenses best preserve task performance, highly conservative self-reflective defenses often increase over-refusal, and multi-round defenses incur the largest runtime overhead. These results provide both a benchmark for evaluating defense side effects and practical guidance for selecting defenses under deployment constraints.

Submission history

From: Tong Zhang [view email]
[v1] Mon, 27 Jul 2026 13:07:52 UTC (302 KB)